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Behind the Mask: Biological Warfare 
By DR. KEN ALIBEK (1)
Although the Soviet Union was a party to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention, it continued a high-intensity program to develop and produce biological 
weapons through at least the early 1990s. The size and scope of this program were 
enormous. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, over 60,000 people were involved in the 
research, development, and production of biological weapons. Hundreds of tons of 
anthrax weapon formulation (2) were stockpiled, along with dozens of tons of smallpox 
and plague. The total production capacity of all of the facilities involved was many 
hundreds of tons of various agents annually.
The Soviet Union's biological weapons program was established in the late 1920s. One 
of the key events which prompted the Soviets to explore biological weapons was the 
typhus epidemic that raged in Russia from 1918 to 1922. During this period, around 12 
million persons contracted typhus; estimates of resultant deaths range from 2-10 million. 
The Soviets realized that if they could harness this destructive and disruptive force, they 
would create a very powerful weapon indeed.
Prior to World War II, the Soviets conducted research on a wide variety of agents. By 
the beginning of the war, the USSR was able to manufacture weapons using the agents 
not only for epidemic typhus, but also for tularemia (an incapacitating illness that can be 
fatal if not treated with antibiotics) and Q fever (which is not fatal but incapacitates its 
victims for an average of 8-16 days). It was also working on techniques for producing 
weapons using the agents for smallpox, plague, and anthrax.
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World War II brought several advances for the Soviets, in the form of German industrial 
techniques and machinery for manufacturing large-scale biological reactors as well as 
other industrial equipment and valuable information from the Japanese biological 
weapons program.
After the war, the Soviet program continued to expand and develop. In many cases, it 
closely shadowed the US biological weapons program. While only a few agents had 
been weaponized before the war, after the war the number of different weaponized 
agents was increased to about ten. A number of weapons to affect crops and livestock 
was also developed. Research during this period also included developing and refining 
techniques and equipment for more efficient cultivation and concentration of the agents, 
and devising methods for producing more advanced weapons formulations for a number 
of agents.
During this post-war period, which lasted until the signing of the 1972 Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention, the Soviet Union formulated its doctrine regarding the 
production and use of biological weapons. In the Soviets' definition, strategic weapons 
were those to be used on the deepest targets, i.e., the US and other distant countries; 
operational weapons were those intended for use on medium-range targets, nearer than 
the strategic targets but well behind the battlefront; and tactical weapons were those to 
be used at the battlefront. Biological weapons were excluded from use as tactical 
weapons, and were divided into strategic and operational types. Strategic biological 
agents were mostly lethal, such as smallpox, anthrax, and plague; operational agents 
were mostly incapacitating, such as tularemia, glanders, and Venezuelan equine 
encephalomyelitis (VEE). For both types of weapons, use was envisioned on a massive 
scale, to cause huge numbers of casualties and extensive disruption of vital civilian and 
military activity.
The Soviets also established so-called mobilization capacities: facilities whose 
peacetime work was not biological weapons production, but which could rapidly begin 
weapons production if war was imminent.
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It is important to note that, in the Soviets' view, the best biological agents were those for 
which there was no prevention and no cure. In cases where vaccines or treatment 
existed--such as plague, which can be treated with antibiotics--antibiotic-resistant or 
immunosuppressive variants were to be developed. This is in sharp contrast to the 
philosophy of the US program (terminated in 1969 by President Nixon's Executive 
Order), which stringently protected the safety of its biological weapons researchers by 
insisting that a vaccine or treatment be available for any agent studied.
After the Soviet Union became a party to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention, internal debate ensued about the fate of the existing biological weapons 
program. The end result was that the program was not dismantled, but further 
intensified. During the period 1972-1992, the focus of the program was expanded. In 
addition to continuing previous types of work (developing improved manufacturing and 
testing techniques and equipment; developing improved delivery means for existing 
weapons; and exploring other possible agents as weapons), new emphasis was placed 
on:
• conducting molecular biology and genetic engineering research in order to develop 
antibiotic-resistant and immunosuppressive strains and to create genetically 
combined strains of two or more viruses;
• studying peptides with psychogenic or neurogenic effects as possible weapons;
• transforming non-pathogenic microorganisms and opportunistic pathogens (3) into 
pathogenic microorganisms;
• testing all of the facilities considered part of the mobilization capacity to verify their 
readiness.
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During this period, the Soviet program not only caught up with the US program (which 
was halted in 1969), but it became the most sophisticated biological weapons program 
in the world by far.
The Soviets understood that offensive biological work had to be conducted with 
especially strict secrecy since the USSR had signed the 1972 convention. In fact, the 
USSR's biological weapons program was even more secret than its nuclear weapons 
program. All research, development and manufacturing of biological weapons, as well 
as any related work, were classified as "top secret" and of "special importance." Not 
even the slightest indication that any activity was taking place in this area could be 
revealed. All work connected to biological weapons was conducted under the cover of 
civilian and defensive projects. Special cover stories were created for each facility, 
building and even piece of equipment involved in biological weapons work.
For any given facility, there were two cover stories, one of which was "open" and the 
other "secret." The "open" cover story was created for dissemination among the general 
population. The "secret" cover story was an allegedly true secret piece of information, 
although in fact it, too, was false. As a typical example of the cover stories used at 
production plants, consider the cover stories created for the Omutninsk production 
plant:
The "open" cover story was that this plant had been constructed and was operating as a 
plant for manufacturing biopesticides and fertilizers. The "secret" cover story was that 
the plant would be used for manufacturing vaccines, antibiotics and other medical and 
pharmaceutical preparations necessary for the army in wartime. The truth is that the 
Omutninsk facility was a reserve biological weapons production facility that could 
produce tularemia, plague, and glanders biological weapons in time of war.
Each plant had a group of specialists responsible for disinformation measures. For 
example, they developed special countermeasures to conceal their biological weapons 
activities from foreign engineering and technical intelligence services. All solid wastes--
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carcasses of experimental animals, solid nutrient media, inactivated samples of 
biological weapons, etc.--were destroyed. To mask liquid wastes that contained signs of 
biological weapons agents (e.g., heat-stable antigens), these substances were 
combined with liquid wastes from civil production. Special charcoal filters for capturing 
all traces of TNT (the explosive substance used in biological bomblets) were developed 
and installed to prevent the detection of these substances outside the facility.
A massive disinformation campaign was conducted after the accidental release of 
anthrax from a biological weapons facility in Sverdlovsk in 1979. Concealment 
measures included the destruction of medical records of the victims, as well as the 
construction of an elaborate cover story that attributed the anthrax epidemic to 
contaminated meat and that even involved the arrest of the peasant whose meat was 
supposedly the source of contamination. Although the West considered the incident 
suspicious, the cover story was largely believed until recently.
As the USSR weakened during the late 1980s and early 1990s, and as more and more 
details were revealed regarding its biological weapons program, the West put increasing 
pressure on the Soviets. In 1991, a series of trilateral inspections was conducted by the 
United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union. The weapons program still existed 
when these inspections took place; the Soviets covered up the evidence as best they 
could.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, in early 1992, Russian President Boris Yel'tsin 
signed a decree banning all biological weapons-related activity. Considerable 
downsizing in this area did indeed occur, and included destruction of the existing 
biological weapons stockpiles. However, there still remains doubt that Russia has 
completely dismantled the old Soviet program.
Some of the doubts in this regard can be illustrated by the example of the smallpox 
virus. After declaring smallpox eradicated in 1980, the World Health Organization 
(WHO) stipulated that only a few authorized laboratories could possess the smallpox 
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virus. These authorized laboratories were eventually reduced to two: the Centers for 
Disease Control (CDC) in Atlanta and the Ivanovsky Institute for Viral Preparations in 
Moscow. However, in the late 1980s, I oversaw the development of the USSR's tactics 
to circumvent both this restriction and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention. The general thrust of our research and concealment plans can be 
summarized as follows:
• Do everything in our power to have the USSR's repository for smallpox virus 
transferred from the Ivanovsky Institute, which was not involved in any biological 
weapons research, to the State Center for Virology and Biotechnology, Vektor, in 
Koltsovo, near Novosibirsk. In the late 1980s, Vektor was doing biological weapons 
research on smallpox virus; the repository transfer would provide a plausible cover 
story.
• Explore the genome of the smallpox virus as fully as possible, to facilitate genetic 
engineering operations with it and to enable an accurate comparison with related 
viruses. This research work was easily justified, as it also had a legitimate purpose. 
Since the WHO was planning to destroy the last remaining stores of smallpox 
virus, it was important to sequence the entire smallpox genome for future studies.
• Using this genetic analysis, identify viruses closely related to smallpox, possession 
of which was not restricted, that could be substituted for smallpox virus in the bulk 
of the experiments. Using this method to decrease the amount of research that 
involved smallpox virus, we could attain our research goals while minimizing the 
possibility of having our illegal work detected. The viruses used most often were 
vaccinia (used for smallpox vaccination), ectromelia (mousepox), and monkeypox.
• Perform genetic engineering work on these viruses, with the eventual aims of 
manipulating smallpox virulence factors and inserting genes of other viruses into 
smallpox to create chimera viruses. The purpose of creating chimera viruses was 
to design new organisms which would have a synergistic effect and/or evade 
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current vaccines or treatments. One of the first chimera viruses planned involved 
the insertion of Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis (VEE) genes into smallpox. 
In the late 1980s, using the technique described above of substituting related 
viruses for smallpox, a chimera strain of ectromelia and VEE was created for initial 
testing. The tests indicated that this chimera strain simultaneously caused 
symptoms of both ectromelia and VEE in subject animals.
• Claim that the genetic engineering work we were doing, which involved inserting 
foreign genes into vaccinia virus, was for the purpose of developing new vaccines, 
especially for research using vaccinia virus. At the time, I was skeptical that this 
argument would be convincing to the international community. Although indeed 
new vaccines can be developed in this way, vaccinia is not ideal for vaccine 
development because of the adverse reactions it can elicit, and in fact there are 
many other agents that would be more useful than vaccinia for vaccine 
development. Furthermore, vaccinia is so genetically similar to smallpox that I felt it 
would be obvious that we were focusing on vaccinia specifically because we were 
using vaccinia as a smallpox model in our research.
Several pieces of information in the published literature suggest that Russia 
continues to follow the above-noted plans:
• The repository for the smallpox virus was officially transferred from the Ivanovsky 
Institute to Vektor in 1994.
• The genome of smallpox virus has been fully analyzed and compared to the 
genome of vaccinia.
• Extensive genetic engineering research has been conducted using vaccinia virus, 
ostensibly for vaccine development. The research has entailed insertion of genes 
from Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis virus and from Ebola virus into the 
vaccinia genome.
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• Special research was done to find a spot in the vaccinia genome into which foreign 
genes could be inserted without disrupting viral virulence. Again, this research 
work was presented as essential for the development of new vaccines by inserting 
foreign genes into vaccinia. However, for human vaccines based on vaccinia virus, 
virulence would not be important (vaccinia is not virulent in humans, only in certain 
types of animals). On the other hand, if this research were being conducted for the 
eventual purpose of inserting foreign genes into smallpox for biological weapons 
purposes, preserving virulence would indeed be important.
This suggests that Russian scientists are continuing to carry out the research and 
concealment plans that were in place prior to my departure for the US in 1992. Of 
course, it is impossible to say with certainty whether this research is part of a continuing 
biological weapons program, for it generally has legitimate uses as well. However, it is 
important to bear in mind that the Soviet Union managed to hide its enormous biological 
weapons program from the West for decades, even after signing the Biological and 
Toxin Weapons Convention. I have provided here only a few examples of the lengths to 
which the Soviets went in order to conceal their biological weapons program. Although 
Western intelligence suspected during the 1970s and 1980s that the Soviets were 
conducting some work in this area, it was only after the defection of a Soviet biological 
weapons scientist in 1989 that the West began to understand the extent of the program.
It is thus critical that the international community continue to pursue the establishment 
of adequate verification measures under the convention, as well as measures that will 
increase the transparency of research programs in Russia and elsewhere.
Notes: 
1 Before Dr. Alibek's departure for the US in 1992, he was the First Deputy Chief of 
Biopreparat, the civilian arm of the Soviet Union's biological weapons program. Dr. 
Alibek's research assistant, Jennifer Guernsey, participated in the preparation of this 
article.
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2 Weapons formulation is the prepared agent, ready to be placed into spray tanks, 
bomblets or other munitions.
3 An opportunistic pathogen is an organism that is not normally pathogenic, but which 
can cause infection in unusual circumstances.
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